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ABSTRACT 
Autonomous control  systems provide the  ability of self- 
governance beyond the conventional control system. As the 
complexity of systems increases, there is a natural drive for 
developing robust control systems to manage complicated 
and emergency operations. By closing the bridge between 
conventional automated systems and knowledge based self- 
aware systems, nominal control of operations can evolve into 
relying on safety critical mitigation processes to support any 
off-nominal behavior. Current research and development 
efforts lead by the Autonomous Propellant Loading (APL) 
project at NASA Kennedy Space Center aims to improve 
cryogenic propellant transfer operations by developing an 
automated control and health monitoring system. As an 
integrated system, the center aims to produce an Autonomous 
Operations System (AOS) capable of integrating health 
management operations with automated control to produce a 
fully autonomous system. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) to support human rated 
space flight hardware is one of the most robust and safe 
systems in industry. Such systems undergo the most rigorous 
scrutiny to ensure nominal and safe operations during a 
cryogenic propellant transfer from storage to flight vehicle in 
preparations for a launch. Command and control systems 
aimed to conduct such operations can be as complex as the 
GSE and flight vehicle itself. The use of models, simulations 
and cryogenic lessons learned  from past experiences are 
constant elements being employed on a launch control 
system. Several technologies have been developed to monitor 
and assess health of flight vehicle components. For instance, 
one of these technologies has been applied to the Space 
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) to improve Shuttle safety by 
reducing the probability of catastrophic engine failures 
during the powered ascent phase of a Shuttle mission 
(Davidson and Stephens, 2004). Other applications have 
employed the use of real-time prognostics and health 
monitoring (PHM) to increase safety and reliability on 
unmanned aircrafts (Walker, 2010). A wide variety of 
industrial applications have embraced the capability of health 
management and prognostics to improve their systems. An 
integrated approach of these technologies can be combined 
with modeling of complex system, continuous health 
monitoring using complex models, and telemetry 
management. Such capability can be encompassed on an 
effort to develop knowledge based systems capable of 
integrating system knowledge with health management. 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) is such 
capability aimed to integrate data, information, and 
knowledge to be distributed throughout system elements 
(Figueroa and Melcher, 2011). 
Autonomous control systems are designed to provide the 
power to self-govern the performance of control functions 
(Antsaklis et al., 1991). A complex system often requires 
interdisciplinary knowledge to be physics modeled combined 
with software tools to produce autonomous control. Some 
systems can employ architectures that combine models, 
knowledge system and data acquisition to produce pseudo 
autonomous systems (Childers, 2007) and autonomous 
hybrid energy systems (Rafeed Leon et al., 2016). 
Autonomous systems that use the advantages of ISHM, 
automated processes and piece-wise system modeling in a 
software architecture are powerful concepts to be explored. 
The Autonomous Propellant Loading (APL) group at NASA 
Kennedy Space Center has taken the task to explore these 
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concepts and develop an Autonomous Operations System 
(AOS) capable of using distinct technologies to produce 
software capable of executing cryogenic propellant transfer 
operations autonomously. 
 
2. PROJECT OVERVIEW 
The Autonomous Operations System (AOS) for the 
Autonomous Propellant Loading (APL) project is intended to 
demonstrate the ability to quickly develop a control system 
that can provide autonomous control and health management 
capability of cryogenic propellant loading operations using a 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software product called 
G2 (Gensym Corporation) combined with several 
modifications to a custom application called the ISHM 
Toolkit (Venkatesh et. al., 2013). To accomplish this, an 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) capability for 
an Autonomous Propellant Loading  (APL) system called 
Autonomous Operations System has been developed. This 
application will provide information on the health of every 
hardware element of the system, such as sensors, actuators, 
pipes, tanks, valves, etc. It will also include an Automated 
Control Sequencer (ACS) which executes control sequence 
steps after evaluating conditions, including health conditions 
of system elements involved in sequence executions. 
The scope of this software project involves the programmatic 
integration of autonomous sequence control, hardware 
component commanding and health monitoring in one 
application. The objective of this software is to perform 
monitoring, health management, commanding and control of 
cryogenic system operations for the Universal Propellant 
Servicing System (UPSS) and Iron Rocket systems. A 
demonstration of these capabilities has been achieved 
through the use of a test sequencer that performed 
autonomous control of cryogenic tank loading and de-tanking 
operations against simulations of the cryogenics hardware. 
 
3. SOFTWARE DESIGN DESCRIPTION 
Some of the main modules that constitute the AOS are the 
following: Top Level, Engine, Sequencer, NASA Library, 
Bridge, Domain Object Libraries, Redline Monitoring, AOS 
Bridge, Application Engine and other supporting modules. 
Each module is saved as a Knowledge Base (KB) file (a G2 
specific format); the KB file format is a proprietary binary 
file that is created, modified, and used by the G2 COTS tool. 
Each module developed in G2 contains all or some 
combination of the following: rules, methods, procedures, 
Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs), class definitions and 
workspaces. G2 is a full-fledge Object-Oriented platform. 
Rules, procedures and methods set up the behavioral 
functionality of objects in the real-time environment. 
Procedures and methods are named objects that execute a 
sequence of actions including, but not limited to, calling other 
methods, procedures and setting parameters. GUIs allow the 
user to interact with the system.  Objects represent physical 
components in the system within the application and class 
definitions define the attributes of objects and the associated 
methods. Workspaces are window-spaces where objects 
exist within the application. 
The high level architecture of AOS is illustrated in Figure 1. 
This architecture includes the deployed application for the 
APL project composed of the UPSS and Iron Rocket 
Systems. The AOS architecture is composed of AOS 
Software Components and Application Software 
Components. 
 
3.1. AOS Software Components 
 
3.1.1. Top Level 
The Top Level module is responsible for the management of 
the integrated development environment (IDE), initialization 
of application software components and management of 
launching procedures to initiate the execution of the AOS 
module hierarchy, as well as the functionality for creating and 
closing the telewindows application that is part of running 
G2. 
 
3.1.2. Sequencer 
The Sequencer is the module responsible for executing 
sequential commands that can be scripted to represent an 
operation. Steps execute commands when conditions of state 
and health are met; and alternate plans may be selected 
autonomously to achieve the final objectives of a plan, in 
spite of unforeseen anomalies. 
 
3.1.3. Domain Object Libraries 
This module contains the domain object elements used to 
build domain maps. A domain map is a user interface to the 
application domain model consisting of every element of the 
system represented as an object. Domain objects are 
connected according to schematics, and incorporate data, 
information, and knowledge about the system. 
In addition to the domain map, a subcategory of this map is 
the control map. This map uses information available on the 
domain map to monitor telemetry obtained from the 
instrumentation of hardware. The control map enables 
execution of commands, and controls command-supported 
elements in the system which includes valves and setpoints. 
In addition, the control map provides the user with a visual 
interface to monitor progress of a cryogenic propellant 
transfer operation. 
 
3.1.4. Engine 
The Engine module executes the main rules and procedures 
necessary to run the application. This module manages 
streamed to domain object element from the physical 
system’s data acquisition system. In addition, it executes 
procedures necessary to interact with real-time data streamed 
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to domain objects, processes the end-user operational control 
map, executes redline monitoring, and manages plotting 
capabilities. 
 
3.1.5. Redline Monitoring 
This module is responsible for redline monitoring on the 
system. Redline monitors have limit threshold values 
referenced with a sensor, including virtual sensors. The 
redline elements perform monitoring activities across the 
system. The triggering of the redline monitors produce alerts 
and execution of safing plans. Depending on the redline 
sensors being used and the type of operation, these redlines 
can pause a main sequence and execute an advance to 
shutdown safing plan to protect the system from potential 
hazards. 
 
3.1.6. Bridge 
This module is responsible for establishing communication 
protocols with external interfaces. This  module manages 
Space Packet Protocol (SPP) data transfer (incoming and 
outgoing) by means of the G2 Gateway Standard Interface 
(GSI) by interfacing objects to an external tool called the 
AOS Bridge. These objects create an interaction with any 
external system that can manage telemetry in the specified 
format. In this case, this module contains all the GSI data 
interfacing object involved in a specific application. 
 
3.1.7. NASA Library 
This module is responsible for integrated system health 
management (ISHM) capability. Within this module a 
machine state analysis is performed over the command and 
telemetry of the elements such as valves and sensors to 
determine health. In addition, several physics localized 
models are being managed under this module to determine 
saturation conditions of cryogenic commodity, leaks, valve 
state assessment, valve consistency, health assessment and 
failure modes. This module is constantly assessing the 
conditions of the system to determine an appropriate 
response. This module can determine instrumentation-only 
failure according to several approaches, as well as 
mechanical failures. 
 
3.1.8. AOS Bridge 
The AOS Bridge provides the means of communication from 
external data acquisition systems (DAQ) to the AOS main 
application code. It runs as an independent process alongside 
the AOS main application on the same host. The AOS Bridge 
relies on a set of required callbacks and classes for processing 
telemetry and commands made possible through the use of 
two G2 Gateway Standard Interface (GSI) objects 
instantiated in the main AOS application. The first GSI 
interface is used to register all telemetry and  timestamp 
variables. These elements are commonly being referred to 
Compact Unique Identifier (CUIs), which represent a unique 
identifier for a hardware end item in the current APL 
application. The Secondary GSI interface supports remote 
procedure call used for commanding. Each GSI interface 
operates as a TCP/IP connection on a dedicated common port 
between the AOS Bridge and the AOS main application. In 
the sections below, the files composing the AOS Bridge are 
listed from which further detail is given on the callback 
structure and classes used. 
 
3.2. Application Software Components 
 
3.2.1. Domain Maps 
The domain maps are the central location for the knowledge 
of the application and supplies information to all the 
application software components. In addition, they serve as 
the user interface to the application domain model consisting 
of every element of the system represented as an object. 
Domain objects are connected according to schematics, and 
incorporate data, information, and knowledge about the 
system. 
 
 
Figure 1. AOS Software Architecture 
 
3.2.2. Control Maps 
These map uses information available on the domain maps to 
monitor telemetry obtained from the instrumentation of 
hardware. The control map is capable of executing command 
and control of command-supported elements in the system 
which includes valves and setpoints. In addition, the control 
map provides the user with a user interface to monitor 
progress of a cryogenic propellant transfer operation. 
 
3.2.3. Application Models 
These models can be instantiated and used within specific 
applications. Generic models from the NASA Library are 
applied to the domain map representation to produce piping 
section object models; flow subsystem object models; 
saturation condition of cryogenic commodity according to 
application specific sensor pair (pressure and temperature); 
valve state assessment on application valves and others. 
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3.2.4. Redlines 
The redline monitor generic capability is used, along with 
user inputs, to determine undesirable conditions of the system 
in which mitigation actions needs to be taken to protect the 
system once a threshold violation is triggered. 
 
3.2.5. Sequencer Plans 
These plans are derived using the Sequencer generic 
capability to provide a set of scripted sequential commands 
focused on nominal and off-nominal operations. Off-nominal 
plans associated with redline triggering are considered safing 
plans since they provide a mitigation sequence that returns 
the system into a safe configuration once an undesired 
condition is met. In addition, other types of control 
algorithms are provided by the sequencer to employ the use 
of sequential commanding in a parallel execution for 
specialized needs required by the application. 
 
3.2.6. Application Engine 
This software component provides an extension of the Engine 
module. It manages a mapping from the data objects 
representing the external data to the domain object 
representation (sensor, valves, etc.). This engine holds 
application-specific characteristics of the mapping and 
allows data transfer. 
 
4. AUTONOMOUS OPERATION 
The capabilities provided by AOS allow the application 
developer to develop an application that represents the 
external hardware for command and control operations. The 
tools within AOS allow for a domain map representation 
using generic libraries for components and models used for 
modeling the real system. These utilities allow for the 
creation of the application software components needed to 
deploy a specific application for hardware operations. Along 
with the application software components, several strains are 
tasked to execute the application software component in an 
integrated manner. This coordinated execution of all the AOS 
Software Components represents the true nature of the 
autonomous operations. 
 
4.1. Nominal Operations 
During nominal operations, the workflow of the autonomous 
engine behaves as seen on Figure 2. There are three parallel 
modules executing their functionalities on the application 
software components. 
 
4.1.1. Automated Plan Execution 
The Sequencer uses telemetry from the application software 
domain object elements to execute the automated script for 
commands. During the execution of the script, which in this 
case is a nominal plan, conditions are evaluated prior to 
command execution. The command execution is supplied to 
the domain object elements and communication is provided 
to the external hardware components  to execute the 
command. 
 
4.1.2. NASA Library Models 
In a parallel effort, the  NASA Library  module uses the 
telemetry and evaluates the domain object elements behavior 
according to the specified models. These models assess the 
application and produces an output that is evaluated. For the 
case of nominal operations, the output of the models provides 
a favorable assessment and supplies the domain object 
elements with the nominal state result. 
 
4.1.3. Redline Monitoring 
In a parallel effort, Redline Monitoring evaluates domain 
object element. The nominal state is compared to the 
previously specified threshold for a redline. Nominal states 
of domain objects do not trigger any redline conditions and 
no further action is taken. 
 
 
Figure 2. Nominal Autonomous Operations 
 
4.2. Off Nominal Operations 
During off-nominal operations, the workflow of the 
autonomous engine behaves as seen on Figure 3. During this 
operation there are three parallel modules executing their 
functionalities upon the application software components. 
 
4 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SOCIETY 2016 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Off Nominal Autonomous Operation 
 
4.2.1. NASA Library Models 
Similar to the nominal operation, the NASA Library 
consumes telemetry from the domain object elements and 
executes the models. In the case of off-nominal operations, 
the telemetry provides off-nominal telemetry values. The 
models evaluate these values and the output of a model is a 
signal indicating that an undesired condition is present in the 
domain objects. 
 
4.2.2. Redline Monitoring 
In a parallel effort, the Redline Monitoring is still evaluating 
telemetry from the domain object. In this case, the telemetry 
obtained reflects an undesirable signal that is compared to the 
redline monitor threshold values. Once the redline conditions 
are triggered, several mitigation actions take place. The first 
one is to stop the execution of any nominal plan and the 
second is to spawn a parallel process that executes a 
mitigation safing plan associated with the triggered redline. 
 
4.2.3. Automated Plan Execution 
Similar to nominal operations, the nominal plan is being 
executed. Once the Sequencer receives the signal from the 
redline monitor, it stops the execution of the nominal plan 
and executes the mitigation safing plan. During the execution 
of the mitigation safing plan, no conditions are evaluated and 
only safing commands are supplied to the domain object 
elements. 
 
5. APPLICATION 
 
5.1. Application Description 
The APL test site will reside at KSC’s Bore Site East. The 
Development Test Site (DTS) is being built by the 21st 
Century Space Launch Complex Program to support testing 
of their Universal Propellant Servicing System (UPSS). One 
major part of the DTS is the “Iron Rocket” which includes 3 
tank stages for both liquid oxygen, LO2, and liquid methane, 
LCH4 (3000 gallon first stage, 500 gallon second stage, 500 
gallon third stage), piping and components. The DTS also 
includes concrete pads, facility power and lightning 
protection. UPSS and DTS will be integrated to provide the 
testing environment for validating APL concepts on a flight- 
like system. 
The Universal Propellant Servicing System (UPSS) includes 
cryogenic fuel (liquid methane, LCH4) and oxidizer (LO2) 
mobile tankers, control and relief valves, fluid piping, 
instrumentation, command and control hardware (see Figure 
4). The command and control hardware consists of four 
Control Chassis and a Mobile Power and Communication 
Distribution Unit (MPCDU). It also has two skids for each 
propellant, one that interfaces with the mobile propellant 
tanker and one that interfaces with the vehicle or iron rocket 
of the Bore Site Project that interfaces with the Control 
Center. The control center may evolve over time and includes 
multiple locations/capabilities including recording, playback, 
video and associated displays, and communication, remote 
(Firing Room 4 of the Launch Control Center) vs. local 
control, and mobile control. Mobile high pressure pneumatic 
trailers will be provided to support gaseous nitrogen (GN2) 
and helium (GHe) needs of an integrated configuration. 
Initial ground testing of UPSS and the Bore Site Iron Rocket 
will occur using Liquid Nitrogen (LN2) and eventually UPSS 
will support loading a small class vehicle (SCV) customer’s 
rocket. UPSS is mobile ground support equipment intended 
to connect with a flight SCV customer’s cryogenic propellant 
tanks and associated fluid systems. 
 
 
Figure 4. Universal Propellant Servicing System (UPSS) 
 
The DTS which includes two vehicle simulator three stage 
cryogenic tanks (Iron Rocket), instrumentation associated 
with these tanks (LO2 and LCH4) and the ground side 
connections, fluid lines, relief valves, command and control 
hardware, concrete pads for both tanks and an additional 
concrete pad for future SCV customers, and structural 
support for all components (see Figure 5). The DTS is a 
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project that is delivering and installing several unique 
capabilities, systems, and infrastructure. These capabilities, 
systems, and infrastructure will be permanently located at the 
SCV Cryogenic Loading Facility (CLF). 
 
 
Figure 5. LO2 DTS Vehicle Simulator 
 
5.2. Application Software Model: UPSS/Iron Rocket 
Simulator 
This computer software configuration item (CSCI) simulates 
the UPSS and Iron Rocket systems for testing purposes. The 
simulator uses the FlowMaster COTS tool to model the UPSS 
and Iron Rocket systems (see Figure 6) and generate high- 
fidelity data that corresponds to various predefined nominal 
and off-nominal test scenarios. It then uses this data during 
testing to provide the appropriate telemetry data in response 
to AOS commands. 
 
 
Figure 6. UPSS and Iron Rocket FlowMaster Model 
 
6. TEST ARTICLE ARCHITECTURE 
In order to successfully demonstrate the capabilities of 
Autonomous Operations System, several hardware and 
software components are used for testing different phases of 
the development. By means of testing the software in 
different phases, the AOS will accomplish a validation and 
verification process that is required to connect with other 
external systems. 
6.1. AOS Application Development System 
The AOS Application Development System is composed of 
a main computer for software development with four 
monitors for displaying data, visualization, domain maps and 
programmable code. In this computer system, the main 
application for controlling and monitoring the cryogenics 
propellant transfer for AOS is being developed. Within its 
local configuration, the knowledge of the system is being 
created by transferring mechanical, electrical and 
communication schematics into a domain map system. This 
domain map system receives data for the outside systems 
(PLC, UPSS/Iron Rocket Simulator, and Gateway) and feeds 
different subsystems (health management, automated 
sequencer control, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 7. UPSS and Iron Rocket Control Map 
 
The development of several subsystems within the AOS 
Application includes a visual representation of the domain 
map for commanding and control (see Figure 7), an automatic 
sequencer controller (Figure 8), health management 
subsystems and plotting features. 
 
 
Figure 8. Automatic Sequencer Controller, Redline 
Monitoring, Timers, Console and Operations Display 
 
6.2. AOS Bridge Development System 
The AOS Bridge Development system is composed of an 
AOS bridge development main computer and a secondary 
computer used to run a basic User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
server to test AOS bridge communications. In the main 
computer, the bridge code for the AOS Application is being 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SOCIETY 2016 
7 
 
 
 
 
developed. The development of the bridge code includes the 
capability of receiving telemetry and sending commands to a 
generic UDP server. The second computer running the 
generic UDP Server will provide a “test” network 
connectionless interface similar to the SPP to Common 
Industrial Protocol (CIP) Gateway code that the AOS Bridge 
will eventually connect to for PLC (Programmable Logic 
Controller) data. This generic UDP server will serve as an 
initial testing server to validate AOS communication code for 
a future integration with the SPP to CIP Gateway. 
 
6.3. PLC Development System 
The PLC Development System is composed of a set of six 
PLCs and a main computer for development. In this main 
computer, the code is being developed to send and receive 
data to the PLCs by means of Compact Unique Identifiers 
(CUIs). The software RSLogix 5000 is being used to program 
the PLC. In addition, Labview is being used as a secondary 
software application to develop a low fidelity simulator 
capable of supporting telemetry and commanding across the 
network. The low fidelity simulator allows modification to 
telemetry values of the different CUIs programmed in the 
PLC as well as displaying commands being received by the 
PLC across the network (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. AOS Network Architecture with AOS Bridge 
connected to LabView Simulator and UPSS/Iron  Rocket 
Simulator 
 
7. TEST RESULTS 
For testing the UPSS and Iron Rocket application developed 
using the Autonomous Operations System, the UPSS and 
Iron Rocket Simulator was used to provide a physics-based 
telemetry responses according to application commands. 
Several strategies for propellant loading transfer were 
explored to develop a nominal and off-nominal plan for 
cryogenic propellant transfer. For testing purposes, the 
physics-based model simulated liquid nitrogen (LN2) as the 
cryogenic commodity. 
7.1. Nominal Operation Test Case 
 
7.1.1. Chilldown 
During the chilldown phase, liquid nitrogen is used to 
decrease the temperature of the system to a cryogenic liquid 
nitrogen temperature range (-321 °F). During this phase, 
liquid nitrogen is transferred from the three storage tanks to 
the vehicle interface valve. Boil-off gas generated during the 
cool down process is relieved through valves that are 
redirected to the exhaust line on the system. Once the main 
tank downstream temperature sensor (TT-1-O2 from Figure 
7) reaches cryogenic temperature, the main block valve 
(MAV-1-O2 from Figure 7) is opened to allow cryogenic 
flow across the piping system from storage tanks up the 
vehicle interface (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10. Chilldown Temperature: UPSS - Iron Rocket 
 
7.1.2. Slow-Fast Fill 
During this phase, the ullage pressure on the cryogenic 
storage tank is increased by means of a Pressure Building 
Unit (PBU) up to 50 psig to pressure-feed the system and 
increase the flow rate to the Stage 1 vehicle tank. The fill 
process for the vehicle tanks is a serial process. Once the 
Stage 1 is up to 100% full (see Figure 11), the other tanks 
follow the fill process (starting from Stage 2 followed by 
Stage 3) and Stage 1 enters into a replenish state. 
 
7.1.3. Replenish 
During this phase, a maximum tank fill level is achieved by 
the cryogenic commodity and a replenish algorithm is 
enabled (see Figure 12). This replenish algorithm monitors 
the Stage 1  tank level and  commands a replenish  valve 
(AMAV-3-O2 from Figure 7). This replenish valve is 
controlled by a replenish algorithm that is executed by the 
Sequencer. This algorithm commands the replenish valve to 
open to 50% once the liquid level sensor (LLT-1604-O2) falls 
below 99.5%. This decrease in liquid level is due to boil-off 
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of cryogenic commodity being excessed across the vent valve 
of the vehicle tank. 
 
 
Figure 11. Slow-Fast Fill: Stage 1 
 
Opening the replenish valve allows more cryogenic 
commodity into the vehicle tank. On the other side of the 
spectrum, if the liquid level surpasses beyond 100.5%, the 
replenish valve is commanded to close (0%). Over time, the 
loss in mass due to the venting of boil-off gases produces a 
decrease in liquid level of the vehicle tank and the replenish 
algorithm enters a new cycle. During nominal operations, the 
vehicle tank for Stage 1 undergoes for 1 cycle of the replenish 
state. 
 
 
Figure 12. Replenish - Stage 1 
 
This cyclic process is dependent on the conditions for the 
nominal operations. This process mimics a real launch 
operation where a real vehicle might stay in the launching 
platform for hours while maintaining liquid level conditions 
until vehicle launch.  A typical launch vehicle undergoes 
several cycles to maintain required launch conditions while 
other parallel operations take place in preparation for launch. 
 
7.2. Serial Loading Vehicle Stage 1, 2, and 3 
Similar to stage 1, the cryogenic propellant loading process 
for the stage 2 and stage 3 transitions to a replenish state once 
the liquid level for both tanks reaches 100%. In a serial 
manner, the stage 2 reaches 100% liquid level after the stage 
1. Once on the replenish state, stage 2 executes 7 cycles 
during the nominal loading process. The difference in the 
amount of cycles is due to the volumetric capacity of the 
tanks: Stage 1, 2 and 3 have a capacity of 3000, 500 and 500 
gallons respectively.  The difference on specific heat for the 
3 cryogenic tanks produces a difference in boil-off rate. For 
the smaller tanks (stage 2, 3), a higher boil-off rate is 
produced which generates a faster decrease in liquid level. 
The Sequencer commands the replenish valve for all the 
stages in a parallel execution algorithm which is constantly 
monitoring all the liquid level sensors (LLT-1604-O2, LLT- 
1609-O2, and LLT-1614-O2). 
 
 
Figure 13. Serial Loading and Replenish for Stage 1, 2, and 3 
 
7.3. Off-Nominal Operation Test Case 
These tests will consist of a nominal loading operation 
followed by inserting preplanned anomalies into the 
simulation. Similar to previous off-nominal tests executed 
during the technology maturation of AOS in its first use on 
the Cryogenics Test Laboratory, common failure modes 
using a 3-stage loading sequence utilizing fully autonomous 
sequencing have been identified. As part of the off-nominal 
case scenarios for instrumentation-only failures, APL will 
identify the failure and allow the loading operation to 
continue; for failures requiring safing, APL will safe the 
system while identifying the fault condition to the operator. 
The simulator and system testing with UPSS/DTS will 
confirm these critical mitigation functions are working 
properly. 
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7.3.1. Non-safety Critical Failure: Instrumentation 
Failure 
Non-safety critical failure can be categorized as hardware 
component failure that does not cause a catastrophic damage 
to the mechanical system or pose a risk to the mission. For 
instrumentation failure, the open indicator for the stage 1 inlet 
valve (MAV-1001-O2) is tested. This discrete open position 
indication is channelized with two different telemetry data 
objects. One signal provides a primary reading and another 
signal provides secondary (redundant) reading. The domain 
object elements have been modeled to correctly represent the 
physical behavior of a redundant signal system. In the real- 
hardware, the sensor is connected to two sets of PLCs. In this 
particular case, an instrumentation failure provides indication 
of a failure of one PLC. For this case, the primary reading 
was selected to fail by a signal loss action which produces a 
discrepancy in telemetry for the discrete position open 
indicator. 
 
 
Figure 14. Instrumentation Failure. MAV-1001-O2-OPN-P: 
Primary Signal, MAV-1001-O2-OPN-S: Secondary Signal, 
LLT-1604-O2: Stage 1 Liquid Level Sensor 
 
In Figure 14 the primary signal for the position indicator of 
MAV-1001-O2 shows an open state (Boolean Flag = 1.0). 
Similarly, the secondary signal for the position indicator 
initially shows an open state. During the loading of the stage 
1 vehicle tank represented by LTT-1604-O2, the primary 
position indicator shows a close state (Boolean Flag = 0.0) 
while the secondary indicator shows an open state when the 
stage 1 tank is about 30% full. 
 
The redundancy models, which are being executed on an 
asynchronous execution, are triggered once an event is 
detected. An evaluation of the telemetry produced several 
conclusions. First, the valve has moved inadvertently due to 
a change in the open indicator. Second, a redundant open 
position indicator for the valve in question is not consistent 
(see Figure 15). The mitigation procedure for this injected 
failure is to notify the operator of the instrumentation failure 
only and continue with nominal operations since 
instrumentation failure is being mitigated by a secondary 
sensor. The continuation of the nominal operations plan can 
be reflected on Figure 14 by observing that the stage 1 liquid 
level keeps increasing beyond 30% after the time segment 
(about 3200 seconds) that the open position telemetry 
inconsistency was found. 
 
Figure 15. AOS response to instrumentation failure during 
nominal operations. 
 
7.3.2. Safety Critical Failure: Main valve mechanical 
failure 
Safety critical failures can be categorized as hardware 
component failures that cause catastrophic damage to the 
mechanical system and poses a risk to the mission if being 
operated during a nominal operation. For this failure, the 
main fill valve for stage 1 tank (MAV-4-O2) has been 
selected. MAV-4-O2 has several telemetry components. A 
valve command signal which received the  desired valve 
command and executes the command, a command response 
telemetry which acknowledges that the command signal is 
being received by the PLC, an open indicator, and a closed 
indicator. 
During a Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), MAV-4-O2 
was identified as a critical component during the cryogenic 
propellant transfer operations. Several failure modes have 
been identified associated with this valve. The selected 
failure mode present in this paper is a mode where the valve 
fails to respond to a given command, which can cause a 
catastrophic failure during cryogenic loading operation. 
For the selected failure mode, the valve is commanded to a 
closed position after being open during a fast fill phase. 
Several responses are expected after a close command for this 
type of valve: 
1. PLC acknowledges that the command closed has 
been received 
2. Open indicator shows a 0.0 value in telemetry. This 
open indicator is a limit switch that turns on or off 
once   the   valve   stem   travels   up   or   down, 
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respectively. Open indicator equals 1.0 when the 
valve is open and 0.0 when valve is closed. 
3. Closed indicator shows a 1.0 values in telemetry. 
This closed indicator is a limit switch that turns on 
or off once the valve stem travels down or up, 
respectively. Closed indicator equals 1.0 when the 
valve is closed and 0.0 when valve is open. 
 
 
Figure 16. Safety critical failure for main fill stage 1 valve 
 
In Figure 16 the valve in question is commanded closed at the 
end of the stage 1 fill phase. In nominal operations, after stage 
1 reaches 100% on the liquid level sensor the main fill valves 
closes and the nominal plan transitions to a replenish state. In 
this particular scenario, the following telemetry is received 
after the main fill valve is commanded closed and a nominal 
valve travel time have elapsed: 
1. PLC acknowledges that the command ‘CLOSE’ has 
been received 
2. Open indicator shows a 1.0 value in telemetry. This 
indicates the valve is open. 
3. Close indicator shows a 0.0 values in telemetry. 
This indicates the valve is open. 
Based on the failure analysis, the valve has failed to close and 
all telemetry indicates that even if the command was received 
by the PLC, the valve remains in its original position. In this 
case, if valve does not close, there exists a potential to overfill 
the stage and send liquid into the vent line which may result 
in a catastrophic failure. 
This failure scenario has been modeled in AOS and a 
response to protect the system has been programed. Figure 17 
shows the system response of AOS to the described failure. 
Once the failure is detected, the model triggers a flag which 
is being monitored by Redline Monitoring. The redline 
monitoring evaluates the received flag with the established 
threshold and triggers the redline. The redline violation 
generates an automated response to stop any current plan 
execution and proceeds to execute any mitigation plan 
associated with the redline monitor. For this particular case, 
the mitigation plan represents a series of commands to be 
executed with the purpose of shutting down the nominal 
operation and protecting the system from any catastrophic 
failure. In addition, the operator receives a notification that 
shows a brief description of the event, time of trigger and 
automated mitigation plan to be executed. 
 
 
Figure 17. AOS response to safety critical failure of main 
stage 1 fill valve not responding to commands. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The AOS has proven to be a fully autonomous control 
software capable of integrating automated control with ISHM 
to command and control cryogenic propellant loading 
operations under a safe environment. The APL has given 
AOS the incentive to evolve from its previous version meant 
for laboratory only operations and expand its capabilities to 
encompass the necessary components and features needed to 
command and control ground support equipment (GSE) that 
is currently undergoing Class B Safety Critical certification 
for future application on flight hardware. 
The complexity of GSE capable of supporting flight 
hardware increases the need to improve robustness on a 
command and control system. In addition, it motivates the 
development of a real-time response system capable of 
ensuring safe operations even on the unforeseen 
circumstances where a critical failure may occur. 
AOS has made possible an increase in the NASA Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) from validation in laboratory 
environment (Level 4) to validation in relevant environments 
(Level 5). Current efforts are aimed to increase the TRL to 
produce a product relevant to ground or space environment 
(Level 6) and generalize the capabilities to be applicable to a 
wide variety of industrial systems. In addition, modifications 
and redesign of AOS are aimed to grant a software safety 
critical Class B classification under a new software called 
Autonomous Operations Mission Development Suite (AO 
MDS). 
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